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PHILOSOPHY OF BERGSON
MYSTICISM.

AND

The spirit pf the nineteenth century, especially
of the middle part of it, was largely antagonistic to
the spirit of mysticism. I t was an age of unparal
leled scientific activity, in which profound researches
were made into the physical operations of Nature in
every direction. And though these researches,
carried over into the sphere of practical life, paved
the way to a mastery over the physical forces un
dreamed of by our ancestors, and in this way helped
to1lift man more and more out of the necessities of
his natural environment, on the other hand, in the
sphere of speculation they gave rise to materialistic
philosophies characterized above all by a deterministic
view of the human mind. For the stern rigidity of
those laws which the scientist found governing
matter—a rigidity which .enabled him to conquer
space and “ charm the secret from the latest moon ”
—was supposed to apply also to the movements of
organic phenomena, so that even man’s thoughts
and actions were caught up into this web of neces
sity. The molecular changes that undoubtedly do
go on in the brain were said to determine absolutely
the consciousness that accompanied them, and it
was maintained that if only an observer could come
into possession of all the data, he would be able to
predict the thought or action of a man at a given
future moment as infallibly as the astronomer can
predict the position of a heavenly body. In an
indiscernibly distant past, the ball of the Universe
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was said to have been set rolling once for all, and it
had nothing to do now—in fact, could do nothing
else—but keep on rolling in the same direction,
each event following and coming out of the pre
ceding one with absolute and fatal certainty. In
Buch a rigidly connected world there was no loop
hole for such illusions as freedom, individuality, and
moral responsibility:—

he frees the human mind from the nightmare of
determinism, and introduces once more the belief
® freedom, creative activity, and the infinite possi
bilities of personal development—in a word, to use
his own phrase—“ Philosophy thus introduces us
into the spiritual life.”
One of the chief charms of M. Bergson’s philo
sophy is the fact that it does not form a closed
system, as is the case with the works of most philo
sophers. This does not mean that Bergson’s philo
sophy is made up of detached aphorisms and essays,
which, as with Nietzsche, sometimes contradict each
other. On the contrary, the earliest of Bergson’s
works to the latest form a coherent whole, each part
supplementing and completing the others in a uni
fied system. But it is an open system, like that of
a living organism, which, though all its parts cohere
and involve each other, is capable of continuous
growth.
There is one principle which lies at the root of
Bergson’s philosophy, and which gives it its dynamic
force. It is this—that Life transcends the Intellect.
This is the master-key to Bergson’s “ Weltan
schauung.’’ It is the melody which is played again
and again in all his works, each time with new and
surprising variations; or, to change the metaphor,
it is the Ariadne thread which guides us through the
sometimes intricate labyrinth of his argument.
From the days of Aristotle to the present time,
says Bergson, the weakness of philosophical systems
has been in the fact that they have, openly or
implicitly, regarded the intellect as the highest
form of knowledge, i. e. the best means of bringing
us into touch with Reality itself. And it is very
natural, continues Bergson, that they should have
done so : for the debt which man owes to his
intellect is incalculable. Through it, primitive man
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« The moving finger writes, and having Writ
Moves on, nor all thy piety nor wit
Gan lure it back to cancel half a line, ^ ^
Nor all thy tears wash out a word of it:”

Yet in spite of everything the scientists and philo
sophers said, the main mass of humanity, which
feels and acts rather than reasons, had always been
certain in the depths of its being of the fact of
its own freedom. In art, poetry, and religion,
which take their rise from just this deeper layer of
our being, continual protests had been forthcoming
against the deterministic view of life. But art,
poetry, and religion are pre-eminently things, as we
say of the heart, while science is a construction of
the intellect; and, though these three have helped
to confirm us in our instinctive belief that the
scientific view of life was merely provisional, they
have not been able to challenge this view m any very
definite and clear terms. Nor was it really to be
expected that they should do so, for they and science
speak in different languages. It is just here where
the importance of Bergson comeB in. He pays back
science in her own coin. Possessed of an unusually
wide and profound knowledge of the scientific facts,
and gifted with logical and intellectual powers singu
larly acute, he turns just this very knowledge, and
this penetrating logic, as it were, back on itself, to
show its own limitations. By thus showing the
limitations of the intellect, by means of the intellect,
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was able to lift himself op, step by step, out of the
nanrow groove, which characterizes the stereotyped
and largely determined actions of the animal species
into an ever-widening freedom of individual choice’
Ihrough the intellect, too, man has been able to
ttie ,w,°lnd®rful PaIace of science, and to conquer
mid direct the forces of Nature according to his will.
•But m the present connection we are not so much
concerned with what the intellect has done and can
I8? 161 Wlth, the im itations of the intellect,
and what it cannot do.
’
.
a long argument Prof. Bergson poihts out how,
m the evolution of man’s faculties, the intellect
arose primarily as a means to action. Its original
function was to help man in dealing with the ex
ternal objects m the world around him
C,°nti^ alt.flnx and “ Darcheinander”
of the physical world about him, it enabled him to
cut out definite objects with definite names; and,
out of the continuous flowing stream of his own
consciousness, it enabled him to cut out definite
and ,c9“ cePts. and by this twofold activity
make social life with its concerted action possible^
Again and again, with tireless insistence, Bergson
emphasises this point, that the intellect is practical in
its origin and directed towards action. And just because the inteilect, by its very nature, is subservient
to the exigencies of action, it takes hold of only
certain parts or aspects of Reality, to wit, those
aspects which it will be useful for us to know, in
P n rCth!F 0M action? in any given circumstance,
r o r the purposes of action in dealing with the
S L i i 9 material world, it is not necessary that
we shouid know their inner nature, but merely just
that about them which is useful for us in our
of the.m - .
isjnet these external
and practical aspects of Reality that the intellect is
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able to bring to us. But of the inner nature of
things — their real essence, “ that which makes
them go,” their élan vital—the intellect can tell us
nothing. If man were simply and solely a practical
being, content with a surface view of things, happy
alone in his intellectual prowess and his command
over the forces of Nature, then his intellect would
suffice for his needs. But man is not such a being ;
he is for ever haunted by
“ . . . , those obstinate questionings
Of sense and outward things,
Fallings from him, vanishings;
Blank misgivings of a creature
1 Moving about in worlds not realized . .

and wherever he goes, and whatever he does, he
cannot wholly
“ . . . . forget the glories he hath known
And that imperial palace whenoe he oame.”

Hence it happens that, in all ages and lands, man
continually strives to get beyond the surface view of
things and see into their inner nature. In this
quest he is seeking now for knowledge, not to turn
it into action but for its own sake. This is true
speculation. So long, says Bergson, as the intellect
confines itself to the pursuit of the first kind of
knowledge, that which is directed towards action, it
is successful to a wonderful degree ; but as soon as
it tries to grasp the inner nature of things as they
really are, it fails at once and completely.
In what is bound to become a classic analysis of
the idea of movement, Bergson points out how
utterly impotent the intellect is to comprehend so
simple a movement as that of a hand across a piece
of paper, or a falling stone. It is impossible to go
into the argument here, which has already been
made familiar to many by the writings of Prof.
James and others. Suffice it to say that the in2 M
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which fades off into darkness." Our clearly formed
intellectual ideas are, as it were, only crystals which
have separated themselves out from a larger mindstuff, of which a certain amount still remains and
exists as an indistinct fringe around and beyond
these definite concepts.
“ A beneficent fluid bathes us, whence we draw
the very force to live. From this ocean of life in
which we are immersed we are continually drawing
something, and we feel that our being, or at least
the intellect, has been formed by a kind of local
concentration.” Or, again, in another place he says,
“ Our understanding is cut out from a more vast
something from which it has detached itself.” In
order to get back into this larger life, of which
the intellect is only a “ local concentration," we
must transcend our intellect. “ We must thrust our
intelligence outside itself by an act of will.” This,
it must be admitted, sounds at first as impossible as
the gymnastic feat of lifting oneself up by one’s
own boot straps. It is at once objected: “ You are
moving in a vicious circle. In vam do you
claim to go beyond intelligence, for how can
you do so except by your intelligence! All that is
clear in your own consciousness is intelligence.
You are inside your own thought, and you cannot
get out of it."
But, answers Bergson, the same objection would
apply to the formation of any other new habit. “ It
is the essence of reasoning to shut us up in the circle
of the given. But action breaks the circle. If we had
never seen a man swim, we might say that swimming
is an impossible thing, inasmuch as to learn to swim
we must begin by holding ourselves up in the water
and, consequently, know how to swim. But if, quite
simply, I throw myself into the water Without fear,
I may keep myself up well enough at first by merely
2
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straggling and gradually adapt myself to the new
environment: I shall thus learn to swim.” . . .
So, in theory, there is a kind of absurdity in trying
to know otherwise than by the intelligence; but if
the risk be frankly accepted* action will perhaps cut
the knot that reasoning has tied and will not unloose.”
‘ Thousands and thousands of variations on the
theme of walking will never yield a rule for
swimming: come, enter the water, and when you
know how to swim, you will understand how the
mechanism of swimming is connected with that of
walking. . . . “ So you may speculate as in
telligently as you will on the mechanism of
intelligence: you will never by this method succeed
m getting beyond it. . . . You must take things by
storm; you must thrust intelligence outside itself by
an act of will.”
J
This it will be seen is no arm-chair kind of
philosophy. It calls for the most strenuous and
most unusual effort on the reader’s m ind; nothing
less than a “ leaping out of its own environment! ”
I t is extremely difficult to get a clear idea of what
Bmgson means by this thrusting of intelligence outside itself by an act of will (which he calls Intuition);
mid it is even harder to write a description of it!
But unless the mind is capable of performing this
feat, it must remain for ever in the outer court of
things; for only by learning this act of intuition can
it penetrate behind the Burface-phenomena of things
and come into contact and sympathy with the
generative forces of Life. Just because this operation
is so important, we venture to quote still another
passage describing i t :—
*
.. “ Let us try and see, no longer with the eyes of
the intellect alone, which grasps only the already
made and which looks from the outside, but with
the spirit; I mean with that faculty of seeing, which

is imminent in the faculty of acting, and which
springs up, somehow, by the twisting of the will on
itself, when action is turned into knowledge, like
heat, so to say, into light.”
Hostile, and even repugnant, as this idea of
knowing by other means than the intellect may seem
to us at first, it is nevertheless, in a certain form, a
process not entirely unknown to any of us. There
are two ways, for instance, of listening to classical
music. One way is to listen, bo to say, from the
outside; with our attention more or less slackened
and directed to the more external aspects of the
music. This will then come to us as a succession of
sounds, of which each seems to be outside the other,
like a shower of glistening drops. Each note will
then seem to exist more or less for itself, so that we
can pause and think of its pitch, or the length of its
duration. We can admire the complexity of the
music, and notice the different instruments that
are playing it. But the more We look at external
aspects of the music, thus dividing it up as it
were into separate parts, the less do the notes in
their totality convey to us a special meaning.
Persons of little or no musical susceptibility or
training never get beyond this outside view; hence
their dislike of all music which “ hasn’t got a
tune in it.”
* •
If we tighten our attention, however, and make an
effort to follow the music, what happens ? The
notes, which seemed at first to be flowing along more
or less independently of each other, now melt into
one another; and the heterogeneous multitude of
sounds resolves itself into a few phrases and counter
phrases ; and the deeper and more perfect our
appreciation, the more does the whole piece tend to
simplify itself into the expression of a single emo
tional state—which splits itself tip into these phrases
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and notes as the only means of obtaining full
expression of itself.
8
So, too, with poetry. If someone is reading verses
aloud to us, we can listen again in two kinds of ways.
IT we let our attention slacken, we lose the inner
meaning of the words. But, on the other hand, the
further we go away from this inner significance of
£ 1 ? » the “ °re ? n we notice and admire, as
though from outside, the beautiful arrangement of its
parts—its peculiarities of rhyme and rhythm, for
instance, and even the separate words and letters.
^ t i f w e p u U ourseives together again, and by an
act of will strain our attention to follow the meaning
once more, what do we find ? In proportion as we
W t “ r l l 68’kya ^troke of sympathy and inspiration,
back into the simple emotional state which gave rise
th®“ ore d° *e find that the particular
sounds and syllables and other details of the poem,
Ti««
indlvldualized and separate on the lower
plane of attention, melt into each other and vanish:
i i S s* alIowedup> as it were, by the continuous
ite d f m°Vement of bought, which , is the poem
And, similarly, with all other kinds of works of art,
m painting, sculpture, architecture and so on—in
fact, wherever creative activity has been displayed,
amTayS trac,e ihese two ways of looting at
infau!:* P i 6 one “
look ™th the eyes of the
intellect, taking notice of external details and par
ticular features, and wondering and admiring, it may
be, the arrangement and technique; and the other is
to look with the eyes of the spirit, which, by a stroke
of sympathy and intuition, places thd observer, as it
were, inside^ the work of art, and puts him in
jwssession of that elementary emotion which was
Ju st so, says Bergson, is it with the greatest of all
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works of art—the creation of Life and Nature. If
we look at Nature from the first or external point of
view with the eyes of the intellect, we trace every
where a marvellous order and arrangement, which
extends from the smallest object which the micro
scope can show us to the farthest bounds of space.
It is the delight and duty of science to describe this
order and arrangement. But we must not forget
that this beauty of external form and arrangement is
only one aspect of things, and not the most important.
It is a result of a particular way of looking at things.
If we strain our attention and make that peculiar
effort of will, which Bergson calls looking with the
eyes of the spirit or intuition, we shall see the same
world of Nature with a new and deeper meaning.
For, just as the onward movement of the poet's
creative activity, falling back, expresses itself in
words and sentences, which, looked at externally,
present an admirable order and arrangement of rhyme
and metre, phraseology, alliteration, and so forth;
so the Spirit of Life, which is unceasihg creativeness,
falls back, in. expressing itself, into the far grander
and more wonderful order of Nature—falls back,
that is to say, in stupendous works of art, of which
each is a world.
And just as, starting from the apparently dead
and lifeless arrangement of the poet’s words on the
printed page, we can, by a stroke of will and
sympathy, live ourselves back into the living,
creative thought which gave riBe to the poem, so, in
a similar way, starting from the apparently dead and
mechanical order of Nature around us, we can, by a
stroke of sympathy and intuition, bring ourselves
into direct contact with the sustaining and generative
forces of , Life, and obtain glimpses of that inner
creative unity, from which all things proceed, that
great Life—
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“ Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
Ana the round earth, and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
A motion and a spirit that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.”

We huy® hoilded this article Bergson’s Philosophy
ana Mysticism; but after having described at con
siderable length Bergson’s idea of intuition, not
much space is left us for pointing out how closely
akin is this intuition to certain types of mysticism.
1 He resemblances, however, are so striking that they
scarcely need pointing out, and will have occurred
to almost every reader. Bergson agrees, for instance,
with the mystics m, declaring that the intellect alone
is powerless to give us insight into the deeper nature
of reality. Both Bergson and the mystics (and in
speaking of mystics I refer to what Bufus Jones calls
the “.positive as opposed to the negative mystics ”)
emPkasis on action as a means to insight,
inere are many problems,” says a modern mystical
writer, which are insoluble except in active life.”
Action, says Bergson, as we have seen, liberates us
from,the vicious circle of the intellect. “ Do the
, IL B? d
ancient mystic, “ and thou shalt know
of the doctrine.” Both Bergson and the mystics
agree, too, that our thoughts are continuous with a
wider consciousness from which they take their rise,
and^by which they are unceasingly sustained. “ We
he, says Emerson, “ in the lap of an immense
intelligence.
Bergson says our lives are bathed in
a beneficent fluid,” whence we draw strength to
live. Whitman calls it “ the float of things ” ; and
Burns Jones says that our lives are continuous with
a vaster life, which floods into our personalities as
the ocean floods the inlet. But the most important
point of similarity between Bergson and the mystics
is this—that both declare that, after painful and
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continued effort, after a constant straining of the will
and a sharpening of the sympathy,-it is possible for
the human spirit to catch glimpses into the inner
soul of Nature, to feel about him—“ nearer to him
than breathing, closer than hands and feet ”—the
august and wonderful presence of that great current
of creative activity which is immanent in matter,that larger Life from which his individuality has
been born, by which it is guided and sustained, and
to which he must look, if anywhere, for its
continuance when, after physical' fleath, his spirit
“ turns again home.”
*
Hence—
" . . . In a season of calm weather,
Though inland far we be,
,
Our souls have sight of that immortal sea
Which brought us hither;
Can in a moment travel thither—
And see the children sport upon the shore,
And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore.”
E dw in

M.

S tanding .

